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This thesis investigates the impact of a new type of “princeling” political connection on 
Chinese listed companies. Three specific issues are examined through three interconnected 
essays:  characteristics of “princeling” politically connected firms (PCFs) with respect to 
accounting numbers in financial statements and corporate governance; the expropriation 
on earnings by PCFs; and the impact of political connections on stock returns. 
Firstly, to examine the characteristics of PCFs, this thesis systematically examines the 
differences between PCFs and their matching firms with respect to financial statement
accounts and corporate governance during the period from 1992 to 2011. This thesis finds
that PCFs have significantly greater profitability and market valuation, but they have 
significantly lower net investments and net fixed assets compared to non-connected firms. 
Moreover, board directors are on average older and have higher educational levels in PCFs, 
relative to non-connected firms. Surprisingly, PCFs exhibits larger percentage of directors 
with academic backgrounds.
Secondly, an investigation is made on the link between political connections and value 
expropriation. This thesis finds PCFs stockpile disproportionately larger retained earnings 
but pay lower cash dividends, compared to unconnected firms. This thesis further finds
such behaviour in PCFs is not due to either investment or precautionary motives. These
results immediately give rise to the question of what happens to the retained earnings. By
examining the components of retained earnings, this thesis identifies a new form of 
tunnelling in the form of a discrepancy in the accounting for changes in retained earnings, 
newly defined as “grey usage”. Specifically, PCFs have higher average grey usages on 
retained earnings than matching firms, by CNY 4.68 million. The findings provide 
important information for investors that PCFs may potentially increase the risk of 
expropriation through grey usages.
The final examination investigates the market response to the “princelings” political 
connection. This thesis compares the cumulative abnormal stock returns between PCFs 
and unconnected firms. Three benchmarks are applied: cumulative market adjusted 
abnormal returns (CMAARs); cumulative risk adjusted abnormal returns (CRAARs); and 
cumulative abnormal returns adjusted from the Fama-French three factors model 
(CFAARs). No matter which benchmark is used, firms connected to PCFs show higher 
cumulative abnormal stock returns than matching firms. Also, this study finds that PCFs
outperform matching firms in the Conglomerates and Industrials sectors, but not in others. 
This result could be due to the predominance of firms in the Conglomerates and Industrial 
sectors in the connected firm samples.
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